Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium Computation in Two-Player Games by Farina, Gabriele & Gatti, Nicola
ar
X
iv
:1
61
1.
05
01
1v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
5 N
ov
 20
16
Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium Computation in Two-Player Games
Gabriele Farina
Computer Science Department
Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
gfarina@cs.cmu.edu
Nicola Gatti
Dipartimento di Elettronica, Informazione e Bioingegneria
Politecnico di Milano
Piazza Leonardo da Vinci, 32
I-20133, Milan, Italy
nicola.gatti@polimi.it
Abstract
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form
Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This
equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium re-
quiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation
(representing mistakes of the players at each decision
node). The scientific challenge is intrinsic to the EFPE
definition: it requires a perturbation over the agent form,
but the agent form is computationally inefficient, due
to the presence of highly nonlinear constraints. We
show that the sequence form can be exploited in a non-
trivial way and that, for general-sum games, finding an
EFPE is equivalent to solving a suitably perturbed lin-
ear complementarity problem. We prove that Lemke’s
algorithm can be applied, showing that computing an
EFPE is PPAD-complete. In the notable case of zero-
sum games, the problem is in FP and can be solved by
linear programming. Our algorithms also allow one to
find a Nash equilibrium when players cannot perfectly
control their moves, being subject to a given execution
uncertainty, as is the case in most realistic physical set-
tings.
Introduction
Computing solutions of games is currently one of the hottest
problems in computer science, as providing optimal strate-
gies to autonomous agents interacting strategically is central
in Artificial Intelligence (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008).
Finding a Nash Equilibrium (NE)—the basic solution con-
cept for non-cooperative games—is PPAD-complete even in
2-player games (Chen, Deng, and Teng 2009) and it is un-
likely that there is a polynomial-time algorithm, since it is
commonly believed that FP ⊂ PPAD ⊂ FNP. We recall
a search problem is in the PPAD class if there is a path-
following algorithm whose iterations have a polynomial-
time cost. In the case of 2-player normal-form games, this
algorithm is provided by (Lemke and Howson 1964).
Extensive-form games provide a richer representation of
strategic interaction situations w.r.t. the normal form. The
study of extensive-form games is much more involved than
that of normal-form games. A variation of Lemke-Howson’s
algorithm, called Lemke’s algorithm, finds an NE in a 2-
player extensive-form game showing that the problem is in
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the PPAD class (Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel 1996).
However, the concept of NE is not satisfactory in extensive-
form games, and NE refinements are studied (Selten 1975).
When information is perfect, the concept of Subgame Per-
fect Equilibrium (SPE) is satisfactory, while it is not when
information is imperfect. In this latter case, refinements are
usually based on the idea of perturbations representing mis-
takes of the players. In a Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium (QPE)—
proposed by van Damme— a player maximizes their utility
in each decision node taking into account only the future
mistakes of the opponents, whereas, in an Extensive-Form
Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE)—proposed by Nobel prized
Selten—, players maximize their utility in each decision
node keeping into account the future mistakes of both them-
selves and their opponents (Hillas and Kohlberg 2002). The
sets of QPEs and EFPEs may be disjoint, requiring dif-
ferent techniques. Given a specific perturbation, computing
a QPE is PPAD-complete (Miltersen and Sørensen 2010)
and can be done by summing the perturbation to the
constant terms in the linear constraints of the sequence
form (von Stengel 1996); due to this reason, we say that
this pertubation is additive. However, the problem of ef-
ficiently computing an EFPE is still open. The scien-
tific challenge is intrinsic to the EFPE definition: it is
based on a perturbation over the agent form, but the agent
form is computationally inefficient, presenting highly non-
linear equilibrium constraints. The only previous attempt
is (Gatti and Iuliano 2011), but no proof is provided about
neither the soundness nor polynomial-time cost of each al-
gorithm iteration (details are in the Supplemental Material).
We show that finding an EFPE is PPAD-complete in 2-
player general-sum games and can be done by means of
Lemke’s algorithm with an extra polynomial computation
cost due to a numeric perturbation, and that it is in FP in 2-
player zero-sum games and can be done by linear program-
ming with the same perturbation for the general-sum case.
The table below summarizes the results known so far. ‘(∗)‘
denotes original contribution discussed in this paper.
Solution concept General-sum Zero-sum
Nash (NE) PPAD-complete FP
Subgame Perfect (SPE) PPAD-complete FP
Quasi Perfect (QPE) PPAD-complete FP
Extensive-Form Perfect (EFPE) PPAD-complete (∗) FP (∗)
In order to prove our main result, we provide also two
original results of broader interest. First, we show that a per-
turbation over the agent form can be formulated as a specific
symbolic perturbation over the coefficients of the variables
of the sequence form (due to this reason, we say that this
perturbation is multiplicative). This shows that computing
an equilibrium when a player does not have perfect control
over the execution of their moves along the game tree, as
is customary for physical agents (e.g., robots) whose actions
are subject to execution uncertainty, is PPAD-complete or in
FP in general-sum and zero-sum games, respectively. Sec-
ond, we show that we can turn the symbolically perturbed
problem above into a numerically perturbed problem. We
believe our approach to be particularly interesting, in that it
not only applies to the computation of EFPEs, but rather is
a more general framework, that can be used to derive, e.g.,
the results on QPEs in a more natural fashion. All omitted
proofs can be found in the Supplemental Material.
Preliminaries
In the following, we adopt the notation intro-
duced by (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008). We
invite the reader unfamiliar with the topic to refer
to (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008) or any other classic
textbook on the subject for further information and context.
An extensive-form game Γ is defined over a game tree.
In each non-terminal node a single player moves and each
edge corresponds to an action available to the player. As cus-
tomary, N denotes the set of players, Ai denotes the set of
actions available to player i and a is an action, a denotes
the action profile of all the players and a−i denotes the ac-
tion profile of the opponents of player i. Furthermore, Hi
denotes the set of information sets of player i and h is an
information set. Finally, ι(h) is the player that moves at h,
ρ(h) is the set of actions available at h to player ι(h), and
function ui returns the utility of player i from each terminal
node.
The agent form (Selten 1975) of an extensive-form game
is a tabular representation in which, for every player i and
information set h ∈ Hi, there is a fictitious player called
agent and all the agents of player i have the same utility
from the terminal nodes. Player i’s strategy over action a,
called behavioral, is denoted by πi(a) ≥ 0 and is such that
for each h it holds
∑
a∈ρ(h) πι(h)(a) = 1. The strategy of
the agent playing at h is the restriction of πι(a) to actions
ρ(h). A behavioral strategy profile is denoted by π.
The concept of Extensive-Form Perfect Equilib-
rium (Selten 1975), also known as “Trembling hand perfect
equilibrium”, is defined on the agent form. We initially
introduce the definitions of perturbed game (over the agent
form) and Nash equilibrium of the agent form since they are
necessary to introduce the definition of EFPE.
Definition 1. Let Γ be an extensive-form game and l(a) >
0 be a positive number called perturbation such that∑
a∈ρ(h) l(a) < 1 for every h, then a (agent-form) per-
turbed game (Γ, l) is an extensive-form game with the con-
straint that πι(h)(a) ≥ l(a) for every h and a ∈ ρ(h).
Definition 2. A behavioral strategy profile π is a Nash equi-
librium of the agent form of Γ if, for every information set h,
the behavioral strategy of the agent playing at h is best re-
sponse to the strategies of all the other agents.
The problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of the agent
form can be formulated as a non-linear complementarity
problem (NLCP). This formulation is not useful in practice
since the high non-linearity raises a number of computa-
tional issues. We now introduce the definition of EFPE.
Definition 3. A strategy profile π is an EFPE of Γ if it is
a limit point of a sequence {π(l)}l↓0 where π(l) is a Nash
equilibrium of the agent form of the perturbed game (Γ, l).
Finally, we introduce the sequence
form (von Stengel 1996) that provides a computation-
ally efficient representation of an extensive-form game. The
set of players of the sequence form is the same of that of the
extensive form and each player i plays sequences q ∈ Qi
of actions a ∈ Ai over the game tree. There is a special
sequence, denoted by q∅ and available to all the players,
and all the other sequences q ∈ Qi are defined by induction
extending some sequence q′ ∈ Qi, starting from q∅, with an
action a ∈ Ai. As customary, qa ∈ Qi denotes the sequence
obtained by extending sequence q ∈ Qi with action a ∈ Ai.
A sequence is called terminal if, combined with some
sequence of the other players, leads to a terminal node, and
non-terminal otherwise. With 2 players, Ui is the utility
matrix of player i and Ui(qi, q−i) returns, when sequence
profile (qi, q−i) leads to a terminal node (here qi ∈ Qi and
q−i ∈ Q−i), the utility of the node, and zero otherwise. The
strategy of player i over sequence q is denoted by ri(q) ≥ 0
and is called realization plan. Finally, strategies are subject
to special constraints: ri(q∅) = 1 and, for every information
set h and sequence q leading to h, ri(q) =
∑
a∈ρ(h) ri(qa).
For notational convenience, these constraints can be written
as: Fi ri = fi, where Fi is an opportune matrix and fi is a
vector of zeros except for the first position whose value is
one. Finally, we recall that a strategy profile r is realization
equivalent to a strategy profile π when r and π induce
the same probability distribution on the terminal nodes.
Given profile r, a realization-equivalent π can be derived
as πi(a) = ri(qa)/ri(q) if ri(q) > 0 and πi(a) is any
otherwise.
The definition of a Nash equilibrium of the sequence
form is standard, requiring each player to play their best
response. In contrast to what happens in the agent form,
the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in the sequence
form can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem
(LCP) (Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel 1996) and can be
solved by means of Lemke’s algorithm (Lemke 1970). In
particular, (Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel 1996) show
that by applying an opportune affine transformation of the
players’ utility matrices the LCP satisfies two properties that
allow Lemke’s algorithm to terminate always with a Nash
equilibrium (we report these two properties, that we use in
the following, in the Supplemental Material). This result,
combined with the fact the computational cost of each pivot-
ing step of Lemke’s algorithm is polynomial, shows that the
problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of the sequence form
is in the PPAD class. Importantly, it is known that, without
any perturbation, any Nash equilibrium of the sequence form
is also a Nash equilibrium of the agent form, while, in pres-
ence of perturbations, this result may hold or not, depending
on the definition of the specific perturbation used.
Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibria and LCPs
We initially show that introducing a specific perturbation
over the realization-plan strategies is equivalent to introduc-
ing a perturbation over the behavioral strategies. For the sake
of simplicity, we study the case in which l(a) = ǫ for every
a, thus leading to a specific EFPE. All the results discussed
in this section and in the following ones can be extended
to the general case in which l(a) is a polynomial in ǫ poten-
tially different for each action a —we recall that considering
only polynomial functions of ǫ is sufficient to find any EFPE,
as discussed in (Blum, Brandenburger, and Dekel 1991;
Govindan and Klumpp 2003).
Theorem 1. A realization-plan strategy profile r is an EFPE
of Γ if it is a limit point of a sequence {r(ǫ)}ǫ↓0, where r(ǫ)
is a Nash equilibrium of the sequence form of Γ under the
constraint ri(qa) ≥ ǫri(q) for every player i, sequence q,
and action a.
Proof. The proof is structured into two steps. In the first
step, we show that requiring ri(qa) ≥ ǫri(q) for every
player i, sequence q, and action a in sequence form is
equivalent to considering the perturbed game (Γ, l) where
l(a) = ǫ for every action a. In the second step, we show
that any Nash equilibrium in the sequence form of such a
perturbed game is a Nash equilibrium in the agent form.
Focus on the first step. The empty sequence q∅ is played
with probability one and then, by induction, every sequence
q is played with a strictly positive probability of at least ǫ|q|
where |q| is the length in terms of actions of sequence q.
Since the behavioral strategy πi(a) is defined as πi(a) =
ri(qa)/ri(q), we have that requiring ri(qa) ≥ ǫri(q) is
equivalent to require πi(a) ≥ ǫ for every a. This completes
the proof of the first step.
Focus on the second step. The proof follows from the def-
inition of sequence form. Nevertheless, we report all the de-
tails. The expected utility (in the agent-form representation)
EUAFah provided by action ah ∈ ρ(h) to player ι(h) = i
given π−h is:
EUAFah (π−h) =∑
a−h∈A−h
UAFi (ah, a−h)
∏
h′∈H\{h}
πι(h′)((a−h)h′).
We denote by UAFi the utility function of player i in the
agent-form representation and by a−h the action profile in
which only the action played at h is excluded. The expected
utility (in the sequence-form representation)EUSFah provided
by sequence qah ∈ Qi where ah ∈ ρ(h) to player i given
r−i is:
EUSFah(r−i) =
∑
q′:qah∈q′
∑
q′′∈Q−i
Ui(q
′, q′′)r−i(q
′).
1.1
L1
(1, 1)
R1
1.2
L2
(1, 1)
R2
2.1
l1
(1, 1)
r1
(0, 0)
Figure 1: A sample game.
In the agent form, for each information set h, a Nash equi-
librium assures that action ah is played with σι(h)(ah) >
ǫ only if EUAFah (π−h) is the maximum among the
EUAFa′
h
(π−h)s for all a′h ∈ ρ(h). In the sequence form, for
each information set h, a Nash equilibrium assures that se-
quence qah is played with rι(h)(qah) > ǫrι(h)(ah) only if
EUSFqah(r−i) is the maximum among the EU
SF
qa′
h
(r−i)s for
all a′h ∈ ρ(h). We show that the two families of constraints
are the same except for an affine transformation not depend-
ing on the actions available at the information set h and pre-
serving the maximum. At every information set h, it holds
EUAFah (π−h) = αEU
SF
ah
(r−i) + β for every ah ∈ ρ(h),
whereαh and βh do not depend on the actions available at h.
More precisely, α =
∏
a′∈q πi(a
′) = ri(q) > ǫ
|q| > 0 and
β =
∑
q′: 6∃a′∈ρ(h),qa′∈q′
∑
q′′∈Q−i
Ui(q
′, q′′)r−i(q
′). Therefore,
the action ah that maximizes EUAFah (π−h) maximizes also
EUSFah(r−i) when π and r are realization equivalent.
The proof of the theorem above shows that requiring the
condition ri(qa) ≥ ǫ ri(q) for every i ∈ N, q ∈ Qi, a ∈ Ai
is equivalent to considering the perturbed game (Γ, l) where
l(a) = ǫ for every action a. For notational convenience, such
a condition can be expressed as:
Ri(ǫ) ri = r˜i ≥ 0,
whereRi(ǫ) is a matrix that we call behavioral perturbation
matrix and r˜i is the residual strategy (i.e., the strategy of the
player once perturbation has been excluded).
Example 1. Consider the sample game of Figure 1. Matri-
ces R1(ǫ) and R2(ǫ) are as follows:
R1(ǫ) =


1 0 0 0 0
−ǫ 1 0 0 0
−ǫ 0 1 0 0
0 0 −ǫ 1 0
0 0 −ǫ 0 1

, R2(ǫ) =
(
1 0 0
−ǫ 1 0
−ǫ 0 1
)
.
We study the properties of matrix R(ǫ) and of its inverse.
Remark 1. Behavioral perturbation matrices are lower tri-
angular square matrices having only 0 or −ǫ as entries.
Lemma 1. Let R(ǫ) be a n × n behavioral perturbation
matrix. Then R(ǫ) is invertible, and its inverse is
R(ǫ)−1 = I + ǫE(ǫ),
where I is the identity matrix, and E(ǫ) is a lower triangu-
lar matrix whose entries are polynomials in ǫ having non-
negative integer coefficients.
Example 2. For the matrix R1(ǫ) of Example 1, we have:
R1(ǫ)
−1 =


1 0 0 0 0
ǫ 1 0 0 0
ǫ 0 1 0 0
ǫ2 0 ǫ 1 0
ǫ2 0 ǫ 0 1

 .
Now we are in the position to formulate the problem of
finding an EFPE as a linear complementarity program.
Lemma 2. An EFPE is the limit point as ǫ → 0 of any
solution of the perturbed standard-form LCP
P (ǫ) :


find z, w
s.t. z⊤w = 0
w = M(ǫ)z + b
z, w ≥ 0
where (the underlined entries depend on ǫ)
z =


r˜1
r˜2
v+1
v−1
v+2
v−2

 , b =


−0
−0
−f1
−f1
−f2
−f2

 ,
M =


0 −R1
−⊤U1R2
−1 R1
−⊤F⊤1
−R2
−⊤U⊤2 R1
−1 0 0
−F1R1
−1 0 0
F1R1
−1 0 0
0 −F2R2
−1 0
0 F2R2
−1 0
−R1
−⊤F⊤1 0 0
0 R2
−⊤F⊤2 −R2
−⊤F⊤2
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

 .
Proof. The proof directly follows from Theorem 1, the LCP
above expressing the best-response conditions of the two
players in the perturbed game. However, we report the com-
plete derivation of the LCP, being useful for our treatment.
The problem of finding the best response of player i in the
perturbed game (Γ, l) with l(a) = ǫ for every a is a linear
problem, defined as
BRi(ǫ) :


maxri r
⊤
i Uir−i
s.t. Firi = fi
Ri(ǫ)ri ≥ 0
Notice that Ri(ǫ) is invertible (Lemma 1), hence by chang-
ing variable, we find the equivalent problem:
BRi(ǫ) :


maxr˜i r˜
⊤
i Ri(ǫ)
−⊤UiR−i(ǫ)
−1r˜−i
s.t. 1 FiRi(ǫ)−1r˜i = fi
2 r˜i ≥ 0
Taking the dual:
BRi(ǫ) :


minvi f
⊤
i vi
s.t. 3 Ri(ǫ)−⊤F⊤i vi ≥
Ri(ǫ)
−⊤UiR−i(ǫ)
−1r˜−i
4 vi free in sign
Complementarity slackness requires that
5 r˜⊤i (Ri(ǫ)−⊤F⊤i vi −Ri(ǫ)−⊤UiR−i(ǫ)−1r˜−i) = 0.
Solving problem BRi(ǫ) or BRi(ǫ) is equivalent to solving
the feasibility problem defined by constraints 1 to 5 . It is
now easy to see that we can cast the problem of satisfying
conditions 1 to 5 for both players as a standard-form LCP
whose parameters are as defined in this lemma.
We conclude this section with a couple of lemmas that we
will use in the following sections.
Lemma 3. Consider the LCP formulation of Lemma 2,
where ǫ is treated as a symbolic variable, so that the entries
of M(ǫ) are polynomials in ǫ. A number of bits polynomial
in the input game size is sufficient to store all coefficients
appearing in P (ǫ).
Lemma 4. Let ν = maxh∈∪iHi{|ρ(h)|} be the maximum
number of actions available at an information set. If 0 ≤
ǫ ≤ 1/n, there always exists a realization-plan strategy ri
such that FiRi(ǫ)−1 ri = fi.
Perturbed LCPs
Before turning our attention to the computational aspects of
finding an EFPE, we introduce some general concepts, per-
taining to perturbed linear optimization problems. While we
target the development of these concepts with our specific
use-case in mind, it should be noted that this section’s defini-
tions and lemmas are of broader interest, being applicable to
any linear program (LP) or LCP. We recall that a basis B for
a standard-form LP with constraints Mx = b or a standard-
form LCP with linear equality constraints w = Mz + b is
a set of linearly independent columns of M such that the
associated solution (called basic solution) is feasible.
Definition 4 (Negligible positive perturbation (NPP)). Let
P (ǫ) be an LCP dependent on some perturbation ǫ. The
value ǫ∗ > 0 is a negligible positive perturbation (NPP) if
any optimal basis B for P (ǫ∗) is optimal for P (ǫ), for all
0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ∗.
Definition 5 (Optimality certificate for a basis). Given an
LCP P (ǫ), and a basisB for it, we call the finite-dimensional
column vector CB(ǫ) an optimality certificate for B if for all
ǫ ≥ 0
CB(ǫ) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ B is optimal for P (ǫ).
Lemma 5. In the case of a perturbed LCP in standard form
P (ǫ) :


find z, w
s.t. 1 z⊤w = 0
2 w = M(ǫ)z + b(ǫ)
3 z, w ≥ 0
an optimality certificate for the complementary basis B is
CB(ǫ) = B(ǫ)
−1b(ǫ)
where B is the basis matrix corresponding to B.
Proof. Since the basis B is complementary by hypothesis,
constraint 1 is always satisfied. Constraint 2 is satisfied
by the definition of B(ǫ). Constraint 3 is satisfied if and
only if B(ǫ)−1b(ǫ) ≥ 0.
Finally, before proceeding, we introduce three mathemati-
cal lemmas that come in handy when dealing with optimality
certificates. Indeed, it is often the case that CB(ǫ) has poly-
nomial or rational functions (with respect to ǫ) as entries.
Lemma 6. Let p(ǫ) = a0 + a1ǫ1 + · · · + anǫn be a real
polynomial such that a0 6= 0, and let µ = maxi |ai|. Then
p(ǫ) has the same sign of a0 for all 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ∗, where
ǫ∗ = |a0|/(µ+ |a0|).
As a corollary, we can easily extend the result of Lemma 6
to rational functions.
Lemma 7. Let
p(ǫ) =
a0 + a1ǫ
1 + · · ·+ anǫ
n
b0 + b1ǫ1 + · · ·+ bmǫm
be a rational function such that a0, b0 6= 0, and let µa =
maxi |ai|, µb = maxi |bi|. Then p(ǫ) has the same sign
of a0/b0 for all 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ∗, where ǫ∗ = min{|a0|/(µ +
|a0|), |b0|/(µ+ |b0|)}.
Proof. The proof follows immediately by applying
Lemma 6 to the numerator and the denominator of p(ǫ).
Lemma 8. Let
p(ǫ) =
a0 + a1ǫ
1 + · · ·+ anǫ
n
b0 + b1ǫ1 + · · ·+ bmǫm
be a rational function with integer coefficients, where the
denominator is not identically zero; let µa = maxi |ai|,
µb = maxi |bi|, µ = max{µa, µb} and ǫ∗ = 1/(2µ). Then
exactly one of the following holds:
• p(ǫ∗) = 0 for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗,
• p(ǫ∗) > 0 for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗,
• p(ǫ∗) < 0 for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗.
Computation of Extensive-Form Perfect
Equilibria
We finally delve into the computational details of find-
ing Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibria. The central result of
this section (Theorem 2) roughly states that the EFPE LCP
(Lemma 2) always admits a “small” NPP. Leveraging this
fact, we quickly derive a path-following algorithm for the
computation of EFPE in general-sum games in which each
pivoting step has a polynomial-time cost (Theorem 3), and
a polynomial-time algorithm for the zero-sum counterpart
(Theorem 4). These two algorithms put the two search prob-
lems in the PPAD and the FP classes, respectively.
We start by showing that, as long as the perturbation ǫ
is “reasonably small”, the LCP defined in Lemma 2 always
admits a solution. In particular:
Lemma 9. If 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/ν, where ν = maxh∈∪iHi{|ρ(h)|}
is the maximum number of actions available at an informa-
tion set, Lemke’s algorithm always finds a solution for P (ǫ).
We remark that when ǫ is a given value, the task of finding
an NE of P (ǫ) has a powerful interpretation. Indeed, it cap-
tures the situation in which the moves of a player are subject
to execution uncertainty and therefore a player cannot per-
fectly control their actions.
Theorem 2. Given a (general-sum) two-player game Γ with
ν = maxh∈∪iHi{|ρ(h)|}, the problem P (ǫ) of determining
any EFPE for Γ admits an NPP ǫ∗ ≤ 1/ν that can be com-
puted from Γ in polynomial time. In particular, ǫ∗ = 1/V ∗,
where the integer value V ∗ can be represented in memory
with a number of bits polynomial in the input game size.
Proof. We illustrate the steps that lead to the determination
of such V ∗. The central idea is as follows: we want to de-
termine ǫ∗ so that, whatever the feasible base B for P (ǫ∗)
may be, the optimality certificate for ǫ∗ is positive for all
ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ∗]. Indeed, it is immediate to see that such ǫ∗ is
necessarily an NPP.
Optimality certificate. We begin by studying the opti-
mality certificate for the LCP P (ǫ), that is, by Lemma 5,
B(ǫ)−1b(ǫ) ≥ 0,
where B(ǫ) is base matrix corresponding to the feasible
base B found by Lemke’s algorithm. Introducing C(ǫ) =
cof B(ǫ), the cofactor matrix of matrix B(ǫ), and leverag-
ing the well-known identity B(ǫ)−1 = C(ǫ)⊤/ detB(ǫ),
we can rewrite the optimality certificate above as
C(ǫ)⊤b(ǫ)
detB(ǫ)
≥ 0.
The vectorial condition above is equivalent to a system of
n scalar conditions, each of the form
fi(ǫ) =
ci(ǫ)
⊤b(ǫ)
detB(ǫ)
≥ 0,
where ci(ǫ) is the i-th row of C(ǫ)⊤. Evidently, fi(ǫ) is a
rational function in ǫ, having only integer coefficients, for
all i = 1, . . . , n.
Denominator coefficients. We now give an upper bound
on the coefficients of the denominator of fi(ǫ), that is
detB(ǫ). Let VB be the largest coefficient that could po-
tentially appear in B(ǫ) and b(ǫ), and let m be the largest
polynomial degree appearing in B(ǫ). Notice that m ∈
O(poly(n)). By using Hadamard’s inequality, we can write
coeff(detB(ǫ)) ≤ nn/2V nB coeff((1 + ǫ+ · · ·+ ǫ
m)n),
where coeff(·) is the largest coefficient of its polynomial ar-
gument. Since coeff((1 + ǫ + · · ·+ ǫm)n) ≤ mn, we have
coeff(detB(ǫ)) ≤ VD := n
n/2(mVB)
n.
Notice that this bound is valid for all possible base matrices
B(ǫ). Furthermore, notice that
logVD = n/2 logn+ n logm+ n logVB,
and by Lemma 3 we conclude that VD requires a number of
bits polynomial in the input game size in order to be stored
in memory.
Numerator coefficients. Since the elements of ci(ǫ) are
cofactors for B(ǫ), they are upper-bounded by detB(ǫ),
which in turn is upper-bounded by VD . Therefore,
coeff(ci(ǫ)
⊤b(ǫ)) ≤ VN := VBVD.
Again, it is worthwhile to notice that this bound is valid for
all possible base matrices B(ǫ).
Wrapping up. Define V ∗ = 2max{VN , VD} = 2VBVD .
We now argue that ǫ∗ = 1/V ∗ is an NPP for P (ǫ). Indeed,
let B∗ be a feasible base1 for P (ǫ∗), and letB(ǫ∗) be the cor-
responding base matrix. Being B feasible for P (ǫ∗), each
row fi in the optimality certificate is non-negative when
evaluated at ǫ∗ for all i. Therefore, we know from Lemma 8
that fi(ǫ) ≥ 0 in (0, 1/V ∗] = (0, ǫ∗]. Hence, the optimal-
ity certificate for B is non-negative for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗,
which is equivalent to say that ǫ∗ is an NPP. Finally, note that
V ∗ = 2VBVD be stored in memory with a number of bits
polynomial in the game size. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3. The problem of determining an EFPE of a
general-sum two-player game Γ is PPAD-complete.
Proof. Let ǫ∗ = 1/V ∗ be an NPP as defined in Theorem 2,
and let B be a feasible base for the (numerical) problem
P (ǫ∗), found using Lemke’s algorithm. Since ǫ∗ is an NPP,
the pair of strategies (π∗1 , π∗2) corresponding to B retain their
feasibility with respect to the LCP P (ǫ) as ǫ → 0, meaning
that (π∗1 , π∗2) is in fact an EFPE.
Furthermore, given that V ∗ requires a number of bits
polynomial in the input game size, each iteration of Lemke’s
algorithm takes time polynomial in the game size. This
proves that the algorithm described is a path-following al-
gorithm requiring a polynomial-time cost at each step, and
therefore the problem of finding an EFPE in two-player
games is in the PPAD class. The hardness easily follows
from the fact that EFPE is a refinement of Nash equilib-
rium, an EFPE always exists, and finding a Nash is PPAD-
complete. Therefore, if finding an EFPE were not PPAD-
hard, then one could use the EFPE-finding algorithm with
the aim of finding an NE and therefore not even finding an
NE would be PPAD-hard. This concludes the proof.
We remark that the proof of theorem above also applies
for an arbitrary ǫ (potentially non-NPP), showing that find-
ing an NE for any ǫ < maxh∈∪iHi{|ρ(h)|} is in the PPAD
class. We summarize the procedure to find an EFPE of
general-sum games in Algorithm 1.
The approach we use in Theorems 2 and 3 extends the
one used in (Miltersen and Sørensen 2010). More precisely,
in (Miltersen and Sørensen 2010) the authors consider a nu-
merical perturbation that sums to the constant terms of an LP
to find a QPE of a zero-sum game, while in Theorem 2 we
consider perturbations over the coefficient of the variables of
an LCP to find an EFPE of general-sum games (and, below,
of zero-sum games). The two approaches can be extended to
1Notice that since ǫ∗ ≤ 1/n, B always exists (see Lemma 9).
Algorithm 1
procedure FIND-EFPE
1. Compute ǫ∗ from Γ as in the proof of Theorem 2
2. Determine a basis B for the numerical LCP P (ǫ∗)
3. Let B(ǫ) be the base matrix corresponding to B in
P (ǫ), as ǫ varies.
⊲ Since B(ǫ)−1b is a rational bounded function in a
neighborhood of 0, B(0)−1b exists.
4. (r˜1, r˜2, v+1 , v
−
1 , v
+
2 , v
−
2 )
⊤ = B(0)−1b
⊲ Note that R1(0) = R2(0) = I , so r˜1 = r1, r˜2 = r2
5. return the pair of strategies (r˜1, r˜2)
find a QPE in general-sum games by using a numerical per-
turbation (the description is omitted here, as it is beyond the
scope of this paper). We now show that Algorithm 1 requires
polynomial time when the game is zero sum.
Theorem 4. The problem of determining an EFPE of a zero-
sum two-player game Γ can be solved in polynomial time in
the size of the input game.
Proof. Like in Theorem 3, we can easily extract an EFPE
by looking at the feasible matrix B which solves the (nu-
merical) LCP P (ǫ∗). However, in the zero-sum setting, we
do not need to use Lemke’s algorithm. Indeed, notice that
in zero-sum two-player games, matrix M(ǫ) as defined in
Lemma 2 is such that M(ǫ) +M(ǫ)⊤ = 0 for all ǫ, because
U2 = −U
⊤
1 . Therefore, the complementarity condition can
be rewritten as
z⊤(M(ǫ)z + b(ǫ)) = z⊤M(ǫ)z + z⊤b(ǫ)
=
1
2
z⊤
(
M(ǫ) +M(ǫ)⊤
)
z + z⊤b(ǫ)
= z⊤b(ǫ) = 0,
a linear condition instead of a quadratic one. This shows that
when the game is zero-sum, the LCP is actually an LP. As
such, a basis for the LCP of Algorithm 1 can be computed
in polynomial time, leading to an overall polynomial time
algorithm. This completes the proof.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we provide a path-following algorithm to find
an EFPE in 2-player games. Our algorithm requires the ap-
plication of Lemke’s algorithm to a numerically perturbed
LCP. We show that the computation cost of each iteration of
the algorithm is polynomial, and this shows that finding an
EFPE in 2-player games is PPAD-complete. We also show
that in the notable case of 2-player zero-sum games, linear
programming can be used and that the problem is in the FP
class. In order to achieve our result, we also develop two
accessory results. The first one shows that the problem of
finding a Nash equilibrium when a player does not perfectly
control her moves being subject to mistakes, as it happens in
practice for physical agents, is PPAD-complete and can be
done by means of our algorithm. The second one is an exten-
sion of the characterization of numerically perturbed LCPs
in which even the coefficients of the variables are perturbed.
In future works, we aim to extend our accessory results
as well as to study the verification problem for an EFPE in
2-player games (that is, the problem of deciding whether a
strategy profile given in input is an EFPE).
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Appendix
Discussion of (Gatti and Iuliano 2011)
We provide a brief discussion about the previous results
about the computation of an EFPE in 2-player games.
Remark 2. In (Gatti and Iuliano 2011), the authors provide
two versions of Lemke’s algorithm applied to the sequence
form, claiming that they compute an EFPE and that the com-
putational cost of each iteration is polynomial. We initially
observe that the authors do not provide any proof of the
soundness of the their algorithms and of the polynomial cost
of each single step of the algorithm.
For the sake of presentation, we initially provide a discus-
sion about the second version of the algorithm (described
in the section titled “Finding an EFPE in Non-Uniform ε-
Perturbed Games”). Here the authors propose the adoption
of a perturbation in the dual best-response constraints de-
fined as follows: for simplicity we report only the perturba-
tion for player 1, it is −ǫ |qmax|+1|q| where qmax is the longest
sequence of player 1. Basically, every time the same utility is
reached at different terminal nodes, they prefer the terminal
node reached with the smallest sequence. We can show that
such a perturbation may not lead to any EFPE. Consider
the game in Figure 2. There is only one player, say player 1.
Any EFPE of this game prescribes player 1 to play R1. In-
deed, at information set 1.1, the expected utility of player 1
from playing R1 is 1, while the expected utility from play-
ing L1 is strictly smaller than 1 (the exact value depends on
the perturbation used). By using the perturbation above, the
algorithm returns L1L2, since the value of such sequence is
1− ǫ2, while the value of any terminal sequence of the form
‘R1 ∗ ∗’ is 1− ǫ. Since ǫ goes to zero, 1− ǫ2 > 1− ǫ.
1.1
L1
1.2
R1
1.3
L2
(1, 1)
R2
(0, 0)
L3
1.3
R3
1.4
L4
(1, 1)
R4
(1, 1)
R5
(1, 1)
L5
(1, 1)
Figure 2: A game used as counterexample in Remark 2.
The analysis of the first version of the algorithm (de-
scribed in the section titled “Finding an EFPE in Uniform
ε-Perturbed Games”) is more involved and we provide just a
sketch. First, the authors propose a double perturbation—an
additive one as proposed by (Miltersen and Sørensen 2010)
and a new one that is multiplicative—and they claim that
adopting these perturbations is equivalent to consider a per-
turbed game (Γ, l) where l(a) = ε for every a. However, this
is not true as shown in our paper where we show the pertur-
bation over the sequences leading to such a (Γ, l). The per-
turbed LCP we provide in our paper and that one provided
in (Gatti and Iuliano 2011) are different, e.g., in our LCP
even the sequence-form constrains Firi = fi are subject
to a multiplicative perturbation, while in the LCP provided
in (Gatti and Iuliano 2011) those constraints do not present
any multiplicative perturbation. Nevertheless, we tried to
look for a simple counterexample showing that the pertur-
bations proposed in (Gatti and Iuliano 2011) fail in finding
an EFPE, but we did not find it. Second, in the algorithm
proposed by the authors, each coefficient of matrix M of the
LCP is subject to a symbolic perturbation expressed as a
polynomial in ε whose maximum degree increases at each
iteration. The crucial issue is that the increase is exponen-
tial, and therefore the maximum degree of the polynomial
increases exponentially, requiring to store an exponential
amount of numbers. The authors use the integer pivoting
in their algorithm. When integer pivoting is used, e.g., in
the simplex algorithm, the values of the numbers stored in
the tableau rise exponentially, but they can be stored with a
linear number of bits by using binary representation. Con-
versely, in our case, since the maximum degree of the poly-
nomial rises exponentially, we need to store an exponentially
large number of coefficients. We cannot exclude the case
in which some coefficients can be discarded keeping only a
polynomial number of coefficients, but no proof is provided
in (Gatti and Iuliano 2011) and we did not find any simple
way to prove that.
Lemke’s algorithm conditions
Lemke’s algorithm (Lemke 1970) is an iterative algorithm
able to solve a linear complementarity problem, provided it
satisfies the following conditions:
Lemma 10 (Theorem 4.1, Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel
1996). If:
(a) z⊤Mz ≥ 0 for all z ≥ 0, and
(b) z ≥ 0,Mz ≥ 0, z⊤Mz = 0 =⇒ z⊤b ≥ 0,
then Lemke’s algorithm computes a solution of the LCP and
does not terminate with a secondary ray.
Omitted proofs
Lemma 1. Let R(ǫ) be a n × n behavioral perturbation
matrix. Then R(ǫ) is invertible, and its inverse is
R(ǫ)−1 = I + ǫE(ǫ),
where I is the identity matrix, and E(ǫ) is a lower triangu-
lar matrix whose entries are polynomials in ǫ having non-
negative integer coefficients.
Proof. By induction on n. The lemma trivially holds for n =
1. Now, suppose the theorem holds for n = n¯; we will show
that it holds for the (n¯+1)×(n¯+1) behavioral matrixR(ǫ).
Indeed, we have
R(ǫ) =
(
R′(ǫ) 0
b(ǫ)⊤ 1
)
, b(ǫ)⊤ = (0, . . . , 0,−ǫ, 0, . . . , 0).
where R′(ǫ) is a n¯ × n¯ behavioral perturbation matrix.
Hence, the matrix
R(ǫ)−1 =
(
R′(ǫ)−1 0
−b(ǫ)⊤R′(ǫ)−1 1
)
is indeed the inverse matrix of R(ǫ). Using the inductive hy-
pothesis, we have R′(ǫ)−1 = I ′ + ǫE′(ǫ), and therefore
R(ǫ)−1 = I + ǫ
(
E′(ǫ) 0
(−b(ǫ)/ǫ)⊤R′(ǫ)−1 0
)
.
Finally, note that (−b(ǫ)/ǫ)⊤ = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0 . . . , 0)
is a non-negative real vector. Therefore, E′′(ǫ) =
(−b(ǫ)/ǫ)⊤R′(ǫ)−1 is a row vector whose entries are poly-
nomials with non-negative integer coefficients, so that
R(ǫ)−1 = I + ǫ
(
E′(ǫ) 0
E′′(ǫ) 0
)
= I + ǫE(ǫ),
where E(ǫ) is a lower triangular matrix whose entries are
polynomials in ǫ having non-negative integer coefficients,
as we wanted to prove.
Lemma 3. Consider the LCP formulation of Lemma 2,
where ǫ is treated as a symbolic variable, so that the entries
of M(ǫ) are polynomials in ǫ. A number of bits polynomial
in the input game size is sufficient to store all coefficients
appearing in P (ǫ).
Proof. Consider the LCP formulation of Lemma 2. We be-
gin by showing that each coefficient appearing in P (ǫ) re-
quires a polynomial amount of memory to be store. This
property trivially holds for vector b. On the other hand,
all numbers appearing in matrix M(ǫ) are either zeros, or
they are obtained by multiplying two or more of the follow-
ing matrices together:R−⊤1 , R
−⊤
2 , U1, U
⊤
2 , F
⊤
1 , F
⊤
2 . Hence,
as long as each of the coefficients appearing in the above-
mentioned matrices requires a polynomial number of bits in
the input game size, the property is true. This is clearly true
for U1, U⊤2 , F1, F⊤2 , so we are left with the task of prov-
ing this property for R1(ǫ)−1 and R2(ǫ)−1. However, since
detR1(ǫ) = 1 (indeed, notice that R1(ǫ) is lower triangu-
lar), using the adjoint matrix theorem and the Leibniz for-
mula for the determinant, we conclude that each entry in
R1(ǫ)
−1 is obtained as a sum of n! terms, each of which is
a product of n entries of R1(ǫ), where n is the size of R1(ǫ)
(the same holds for R2(ǫ)). Therefore, the property holds,
showing that each coefficient in M(ǫ) and b requires a poly-
nomial amount of memory to be stored.
We now show that the maximum degree appearing in
M(ǫ) is 2n. This is a consequence of the observation above:
since each entry in R1(ǫ)−1 is obtained as sum of n! terms,
each of which is a product of n entries of R1(ǫ), the maxi-
mum degree appearing in R1(ǫ)−1 is n, where n is the size
of R1(ǫ) (the same holds for R2(ǫ)). Now, since each ele-
ment of M(ǫ) is obtained from the product of at most two
matrices dependent on ǫ, the maximum degree appearing in
M(ǫ) (and therefore in P (ǫ)) is 2n.
Thus, we have a polynomial amount of coefficients to
store, each of which requires a polynomial amount of mem-
ory. The required space is therefore polynomial.
Lemma 4. Let ν = maxh∈∪iHi{|ρ(h)|} be the maximum
number of actions available at an information set. If 0 ≤
ǫ ≤ 1/n, there always exists a realization-plan strategy ri
such that FiRi(ǫ)−1 ri = fi.
Proof. We will prove that there always exists a realization-
plan strategy profile y such that Ri(ǫ)y ≥ 0 when 0 ≤ ǫ ≤
1/ν. This statement is equivalent to that of the lemma.
We let such realization-plan strategy profile y be defined
as follows:
y(q∅) = 1, y(qa) =
y(q)
|ρ(h)|
,
where h is the information set to which q leads. It is imme-
diate to see that such y is indeed a realization-plan strategy
profile, that is Fiy = fi. Indeed,∑
a∈ρ(h)
y(qa) =
∑
a∈ρ(h)
y(q)
|ρ(h)|
= y(q).
We now prove that y is such that Ri(ǫ)y ≥ 0 for all 0 <
ǫ ≤ 1/ν. Indeed, notice that because of the peculiar structure
of Ri(ǫ), the condition R(ǫ)y ≥ 0 is actually equivalent to
y(qa) ≥ ǫy(q), ∀q.
Since |ρ(h)| ≤ ν for all q and 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/ν by hypothesis,
we have 1/|ρ(h)| ≥ ǫ for all q, and the inequality above
holds. This completes the proof.
Lemma 6. Let p(ǫ) = a0 + a1ǫ1 + · · · + anǫn be a real
polynomial such that a0 6= 0, and let µ = maxi |ai|. Then
p(ǫ) has the same sign of a0 for all 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ∗, where
ǫ∗ = |a0|/(µ+ |a0|).
Proof. We prove that when a0 > 0, p(ǫ) is positive for all
0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ∗. Indeed,
p(ǫ) = a0 + a1ǫ
1 + · · ·+ anǫ
n
> a0 − µǫ
∞∑
i=0
ǫi
= a0 −
µǫ
1− ǫ
.
Since ǫ ≤ ǫ∗ = a0/(µ+ a0) we have
p(ǫ) > a0 −
µa0
µ+ a0 − a0
= 0.
To conclude the proof, we need to show that when a0 < 0,
p(ǫ) is negative for all 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫ∗. The proof of this part is
completely symmetric to that of the previous part.
Lemma 8. Let
p(ǫ) =
a0 + a1ǫ
1 + · · ·+ anǫ
n
b0 + b1ǫ1 + · · ·+ bmǫm
be a rational function with integer coefficients, where the
denominator is not identically zero; let µa = maxi |ai|,
µb = maxi |bi|, µ = max{µa, µb} and ǫ∗ = 1/(2µ). Then
exactly one of the following holds:
• p(ǫ∗) = 0 for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗,
• p(ǫ∗) > 0 for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗,
• p(ǫ∗) < 0 for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗.
Proof. If the numerator of p(ǫ) is identically zero, the thesis
follows trivially, as p(ǫ) = 0 for all ǫ, while the denominator
is never zero for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗ due to Lemma 6. If, on
the other hand, the numerator of p(ǫ) is not identically zero,
there exist q and r, both non-negative, such that p can be
written as
p(ǫ) =
ǫq(aq + aq+1ǫ+ · · ·+ anǫ
n−q)
ǫr(br + br+1ǫ1 + · · ·+ bnǫn−r)
,
with aq, br 6= 0. Since aq and br are integer, |aq|, |br| ≥ 1
and we have
ǫ∗ =
1
2µ
≤ min
{
|aq|
µa + |aq|
,
|br|
µb + |br|
}
.
Using Lemma 7 we conclude that the sign of p(ǫ) is con-
stant, and equal to that of aq/br, for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ∗.
Lemma 9. If 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/ν, where ν = maxh∈∪iHi{|ρ(h)|}
is the maximum number of actions available at an informa-
tion set, Lemke’s algorithm always finds a solution for P (ǫ).
Proof. We follow the same proof structure as that in
(Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel 1996, Section 4). In
particular, we prove that if U1, U2 < 0, then conditions (a)
and (b) of Lemma 10 hold for all problems P (ǫ) defined in
Lemma 2. Notice that we can always assume U1, U2 < 0
without loss of generality, as we can apply an offset to the
payoff matrices leaving the game unaltered.
Condition (a). We need to show that when U1, U2 < 0,
then z⊤M(ǫ)z ≥ 0 for all z ≥ 0. We have:
z⊤M(ǫ)z = r˜⊤1 R1(ǫ)
−⊤(−U1 − U2)R2(ǫ)
−1r˜2.
Substituting U = −U1 − U2 > 0 and using Lemma 1:
z⊤M(ǫ)z = r˜⊤1 (I + ǫE1(ǫ)
⊤)U(I + ǫE2(ǫ))r˜2
≥ r˜⊤1 Ur˜2.
(1)
When z ≥ 0, then r˜1, r˜2 ≥ 0 and we conclude that
r˜⊤1 Ur˜2 ≥ 0, which implies the thesis.
Condition (b). We already proved (Equation 1) that
z⊤M(ǫ)z ≥ r˜⊤1 Ur˜2,
where U > 0. In order for z⊤M(ǫ)z to be zero given z ≥ 0,
it is necessary that r˜1, r˜2 = 0. Defining v1 = v+1 − v
−
1 and
v2 = v
+
2 − v
−
2 , we have
M(ǫ)z =


R1(ǫ)
−⊤F⊤1 v1
R2(ǫ)
−⊤F⊤2 v2
0
0
0
0

 , z
⊤b = b⊤z = f⊤1 v1+f
⊤
2 v2.
Hence, in order to complete the proof, it suffices to show that
Ri(ǫ)
−⊤F⊤i vi ≥ 0 =⇒ f
⊤
i vi ≥ 0 (i ∈ {1, 2}).
To this end, we consider the following linear optimization
problem Yi(ǫ), and its dual Y¯i(ǫ):
Yi(ǫ) :


maxr˜i 0
s.t. FiRi(ǫ)−1r˜i = fi
r˜i ≥ 0
,
Y¯i(ǫ) :
{
minvi f
⊤
i vi
s.t. Ri(ǫ)−⊤F⊤i vi ≥ 0
.
Notice that Yi(ǫ) is feasible since ǫ ≤ 1/ν by hypothesis
(Lemma 4). Indeed, with such an ǫ the induced perturbed
game (Γ, l) is such that
∑
a∈ρ(h) l(a) < 1 for every h.
By the strong duality theorem, we conclude that whenever
the constraint of the dual problem is satisfied, the objec-
tive value is non-negative, that is Ri(ǫ)−⊤F⊤i vi ≥ 0 =⇒
f⊤i vi ≥ 0 as we aimed to show.
